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Solidarity, Liability, and the New
Regime of Corporate Property in
Post-Revolutionary France
Tyson Leuchter
1 Sandrié-Vincourt  could  hide  the  truth  no  longer.  A  Paris  stockbroker  and agent  for
numerous sizable accounts, he had been suspected of serious financial misdeeds. He had,
the rumour went, been trading in the public debt on his own behalf, an action expressly
forbidden by the regulations governing the Paris Stock Exchange and the stockbrokers.
Worse, due to this purported illicit trading, it was alleged that Sandrié-Vincourt had run
up immense debts, which threatened to drive him and his counterparties into financial
ruin. For years, Sandrié-Vincourt had vigorously denied any wrongdoing, going so far as
to open his books for an audit by the Company of Parisian Brokers, the corporate body
with state-sanctioned monopoly privileges on financial intermediation at the Exchange.1
And thus far, the auditors had not been able to find any evidence of wrongdoing. But the
weight  of  Sandrié-Vincourt’s  debts—financial,  professional,  perhaps  also  moral—had
become too great for him to bear. The rumours proved to be all too true. As revealed on
26 August 1823,  Sandrié-Vincourt had,  in fact,  accrued gargantuan debts.  Thoroughly
insolvent, he faced social shame, professional disbarment, and debt imprisonment.2 
2 He could hide the truth no longer, but Sandrié-Vincourt could still, however, flee. By the
close of August 1823, he and another stockbroker implicated in the scandal had escaped
France and the looming legal  repercussions.  The debts,  however,  remained.  Sandrié-
Vincourt’s  creditors—numbering more than two hundred persons and including both
aristocrats and the sons of Restoration deputies in their ranks—banded together in the
hopes of pursuing debt recovery.3 Their plan was to hold the Company of Parisian Brokers
collectively responsible.  This strategy hinged upon the concept of  ‘solidarité,’  or  joint
responsibility, the legal notion that one party could be held liable for debts contracted by
another,  so  long  as  both  parties  were  connected  through  an  appropriate  property
relationship.  Since  the  Company  was  officially  tasked  with  supervising  the  Paris
stockbrokers, the creditors’ logic went, that corporate body was therefore responsible for
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debts  stemming  from  Sandrié-Vincourt’s  ill-fated  management  of  his  own  property.
Corporate  representation,  in  this  view,  entailed  shared  liability  over  property
relationships at the Paris Stock Exchange. 
3 The Company disagreed,  and the  dispute  moved to  the courts.  The  subsequent  trial
revolved  around  critically  unresolved  questions  of  property,  solidarity,  and  liability.
What  would  become  of  Sandrié-Vincourt’s  debts,  now that  Sandrié-Vincourt  himself
could not  be  made to pay ?  Did the Company’s  supervisory authority  implicate  it  in
property relationships of joint responsibility ? And were the members of that Company
therefore compelled to answer for each others’ actions ? Sandrié-Vincourt’s creditors and
the  Company  provided  opposing  answers  to  these  questions,  revealing  conflicting
interpretations  of  the  relationship  between  corporate  property  and  corporate
representation, between financial responsibility and liability.
4 The Company’s corporate status was reaffirmed in 1816, as part of a raft of measures
financing the substantial war indemnity levied upon the Restoration regime. It was part
of the contested revival of corporate privilege in a legal and social world that, in principle
at  least,  had  removed  pre-revolutionary  barriers  to  property  and  employment.  The
destruction of corporate privilege was, of course, neither immediate nor ever total, with
multiple entities surviving the abolition of the corporations during the Revolution.4 But
survival did not necessarily betoken unbroken continuity. As William Sewell has argued
regarding  the  persistence  of  corporatist  language  in  nineteenth-century  labour
movements,  ‘it  would be insufficient,  however,  simply to note that  workers  retained
corporate sensibilities as late as 1848. For the meaning of corporate phrases or institutions
was inevitably altered by changes in the surrounding society.’5
5 Examining this particular case of the Company of Parisian Brokers will contribute to our
understanding of how, within the post-revolutionary economic and legal landscape, a
space was carved out for intermediary bodies and collective professional associations that
were, facially at least, reminiscent of Old Regime corporatism. In a similar context, Claire
Lemercier has convincingly shown how the Paris Chamber of Commerce established a
space for  itself  within  the  architecture  of  the  post-revolutionary  state.6 The  French
government faced a troubling lack of  information about the complex and developing
economic sector.7 Into this void, she argues, stepped the Paris Chamber of Commerce—a
‘reconstruction and not restoration’8 of the pre-revolutionary institution—furnishing the
state with invaluable economic and statistical data, acting as a sort of opinion clearing
house  for  commercial  actors,  and,  perhaps  most  crucially,  playing  an  essential
consultative role in matters of law and regulation.9 The development, however subtle or,
in her phrasing, ‘discreet,’ of such an intermediary body thus prompts a rethinking of the
nature of the post-revolutionary, liberal state. Rather than either strongly interventionist
or weakly passive, she argues, we should envision the post-revolutionary state as ‘blurry
or flexible.’10 The boundaries between state, citizen, and collective bodies were permeable
and uncertain.
6 However, unlike the Chamber of Commerce, the Company was not a consultative body,
but rather a corporate representative body of  an individual  profession—precisely the
kind of particularism that the Chamber of Commerce strenuously sought to avoid. The
Chamber of Commerce, Lemercier notes, was fiercely opposed to the re-establishment of
corporate  professional  bodies,  as  part  of  a  battle  between ‘two legitimacies’—that  is,
whether  post-revolutionary  intermediary  bodies  were  permissible  because  they
represented commerce or the economy in general versus representing the particularised
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interests  of  a  certain  profession  or  group.11 As  opposed  to  the  Paris  Chamber  of
Commerce, the Company of Parisian Brokers was a partisan of this latter side in the battle
for  legitimacy  in  the  post-revolutionary  state ;  it  was  therefore  compelled  to  follow
different rhetorical, legal, and intellectual strategies to defend its institutional position.
As Pierre Rosanvallon has written, ‘the permanent denunciation of corporatisms thus
corresponds to a double movement. It refers both to a fantasy (the spectre of corporatism
is seen behind every particular interest) and to a reality : the difficulty of formulating a
“modern corporatism” and the almost obligatory drift towards an ‘old corporatism’ of
any  attempt  to  put  in  place  any  forms  of  professional  regulation.’12 Examining  the
Sandrié-Vincourt scandal,  and the Company’s eventually successful legal defence,  will
illuminate just how such a ‘modern corporatism’ could emerge from the shadow of the
old,  by  appealing  to  the  nature  of  collective  representation,  liability,  and  corporate
property.
 
Revolutionary Destruction and Napoleonic
Reconstruction of the Company of Parisian Brokers
7 An early and important target of revolutionary zeal had been corporate privilege. The
night of 4 August, 1789 witnessed a dramatic foreswearing of social privilege as a valid
property right.13 The subsequent Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen stipulated
that citizens were to enjoy formal legal equality and that public office was open to all
citizens ‘without distinction other than that of their virtues and of their talents.’14 
8 But if corporate property had been erased from public power, that did not necessarily
extend to the private sphere ; the corps, trade corporations or guilds, still greatly divided
the economy into restricted domains. These guilds were an ancient part of the urban
texture of France—the linen makers of Paris, for instance, dated their corporate origins as
far  back  as  1278,  with  the  city’s  vinegar  makers  not  far  behind  with  their  claimed
foundations in 1294.15 Trade corporations tightly controlled their designated professions,
determining  production  methods,  overseeing  quality  control  (including  over  critical
issues of food safety, where appropriate),  regulating skill  acquisition and professional
advancement,  mediating  relationships  between  apprentices  and  masters,  as  well  as
providing for a kind of inwardly-focused moral community amongst members.16 These
corporations also held monopoly privileges on production, such that one was legally
required to join the relevant corporation in order to exercise a protected profession.
These  monopolies  were  not  absolute :  some urban areas  (most  notably  the  faubourg
Saint-Antoine) laid outside corporate jurisdictional purview, while some workers simply
disregarded  regulations  and  produced  goods  outside  the  sanction  of  a  corporate
monopoly.17 Nonetheless, corporations that held privileged monopolies held them as a
form of legally protected property18 and guarded such property zealously.19
9 The  corporations  were  temporarily  abolished  in  early  1776,  as  part  of  Anne-Robert-
Jacques Turgot’s  ambitious and brief  run as Controller-General  of  Finances ;  after his
dismissal in May of that same year, the trade corporations were gradually re-established,
such  that  by  ‘the  late  1780s … corporations  throughout  France  were  once  again
functioning and participating in the system of  privilege in which they were a major
component,’ though Turgot’s abortive reforms had weakened their institutional cohesion.
20 
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10 The  corporations  also  survived  the  initial  abolitions  of  privilege  in  the  early
Revolutionary period.  As  Honoré-Gabriel  Riquetti  de Mirabeau claimed in 1789 while
arguing for the expropriation of ecclesiastical properties, trade corporations were akin to
individual proprietors in that they could legitimately hold, invest, and dispose of their
own property freely.21 Unlike ecclesiastical property, at this point the corporations were
deemed an acceptable form of private property.
11 This acceptance of corporate property would not last. As the Revolution progressed, the
corporations  came  to  be  seen  not  as  legitimate  property,  but  as  an  atavism  of
particularistic  privilege.  Thus  the  d’Allarde  and  Le  Chapelier  laws  of  1791  declared
corporations and associations suppressed, exclusive monopolies dismantled, and barriers
to  entry  to  the  professions  largely  removed.  This  destruction  of  corporatism  and
corporate property was part  of  the Revolution’s  wider transformation of  property in
general ; just as the annihilation of social privilege and of property rights in public power
had  supposedly  enabled  citizens  to  interact  as  legal  equals,  the  prohibition  of
corporations permitted those citizens to transact with each other as formally equal, and
individual, economic agents.22 As Isaac-René-Guy Le Chapelier, namesake of the titular
law, forthrightly stated, ‘there are no longer any corporations in the state ; there is only
the interest of every individual and the general interest. No one is permitted to inspire in
other citizens an intermediary interest, to separate them from the public good by a spirit
of corporation.’23
12 Nonetheless, the state did perceive a desire to balance a freshly liberalised labour market
against the needs of public stability.  This drive for balance led the administration to
permit  a  certain  number  of  ‘syndical  chambers,’  which  acted  as  semi-autonomous
governing bodies,  under  the  supervision of  the  state.24 The  ‘danger’  of  a  completely
unregulated economy therefore was mitigated through a partial return to corporatism.
Beginning  during  the  Napoleonic  regime,  those  professions  deemed  essential  to
maintaining a secure food supply for the capital  were granted a degree of  corporate
autonomy. As early as 1801, the state permitted the bakers of Paris to form a professional
association with binding powers on its members, with the city’s butchers soon following
in 1802.25
13 By  1819,  twenty-four  professions  had  been  organised  into  professional  syndicates.26
However, the political landscape of the Restoration regime required forging a delicate
compromise between the resurgence of intermediary bodies between state and citizen
and  post-revolutionary  political  ideals  that  centrally  upheld  free  and  legally
disencumbered access to the labour market. According to Francis Démier, this impetus
emerged from two main areas : a popular reaction to the deregulated professions, which
envisioned the newly liberalised labour markets as an undesirable loosening of  long-
standing  social  bonds ;  and  an  elite  political  strategy,  in  which  the  royalist  ‘ultras’
couched  their  counter-revolutionary  claims  in  calls  for  a  return  to  corporatism.27 
Restoration liberals  responded by allowing certain forms of  market  regulation,  while
simultaneously  disavowing that  this  regulation represented a  return to  the  previous
corporate order.28 This compromise sought to address the experienced dislocations of the
new economic order, while also evading the taint of legal privilege, the accusation of
which could unite political opposition across otherwise thorny political cleavages.29 As
Démier writes, ‘thus the idea emerges, in the experience of the Restoration, that in order
to take root durably, the “market” must be mastered, its practice regulated, the risks it
Solidarity, Liability, and the New Regime of Corporate Property in Post-Revol...
La Révolution française, 15 | 2018
4
represents attenuated.’30 The Restoration thus aimed to chart a ‘middle way’ between
economic liberalism properly speaking and corporatism.
14 The Company of Parisian Brokers formed a part of this trajectory. The last corporation to
be venalized, it fell to the Revolutionary assault on corporate privilege in 1791.31 With the
nation’s financial markets in turmoil, the Paris Stock Exchange itself only intermittently
functioned, repeatedly opening and closing during the Revolution.32 The Exchange was
eventually definitively re-founded through a series of laws and regulations in 1801.33 The
Company of Parisian Brokers was brought back into existence, with the brokers once
again securing a legal monopoly on financial intermediation at the Exchange. In addition,
a  syndical  chamber  for  the  Company  was  created,  composed  of  one  syndic  and  six
adjuncts. Unlike other freestanding legal bodies of the same name, this syndical chamber
served as a supervisory and disciplinary board within the Company as a whole.34
15 Similar to the Chamber of Commerce, this new Company was reconstructed, rather than
restored. Napoléon, along with Minister of the Interior Jean-Antoine Chaptal and then-
director of the French Sinking Fund Nicolas Mollien, were highly concerned with the legal
remit and professional probity of the Company. As Mollien wrote in a letter to Chaptal in
1801, ‘the Paris Stock Exchange needs a complete regeneration ; most of the brokers in
Paris are speculators, while they must be nothing other than commission agents. This
revolution in morals [moeurs] is necessary and will be difficult. Perhaps it will be possible
to help by directing a constant observation over all the movements of the Exchange…’35
Securing  such  a  moral  regeneration,  Mollien  suggested,  required  greater  vigour  in
policing the activities of the brokers, forbidding them from acting as principal parties for
their own account and turning them rather into ‘commission agents,’  who could only
profit  instead by assessing a  fee  or  commission on each individual  transaction.  This
restriction on the legally permissible range of the brokers’ activity would be matched by
greater surveillance over the Exchange in general, and especially by close attention to the
candidates named to the initial cohort of the new Company of Parisian Brokers. Of the
seventy-one brokers eventually named in 1801, only seventeen had practiced before the
Revolution.36
16 Though the Company would largely remain within the institutional architecture created
by Napoléon, his decisive defeat in 1815 augured significant shifts in the brokers’ legal
rights and responsibilities. France in 1815 was an occupied country, and the Restoration
government a regime saddled with a war indemnity of 700 million francs.37 While this
indemnity was primarily financed through public debt, the state also searched for means
of  increasing  revenue  beyond  borrowing.38 It  would  find  one  such  means  in  public
functionaries, as seen in the law of 28 April 1816.39
17 The law constituted significant revision of the state’s finances. Addressing a broad range
of budgetary matters, it significantly changed the legal status of several classes of public
functionary,  including  the  lawyers  to  the  French  High  Court,  the  notaries,  and  the
brokers.40 It increased the ‘caution money,’ a mandatory professional fee, for the brokers
to 125,000 francs.41 This money was entrusted to the state, which paid interest at five
percent  annually.  In  exchange,  the  legal  monopoly  of  the  Company  was  reaffirmed.
Indeed, it was expanded : Title IX, Article 91 granted the brokers the right to transmit
office to designated successors, further immuring the profession within the membership
of the Company.42
18 While  entrenching  the  Company’s  monopoly  in  law,  the  Restoration  state  was
nonetheless keen to avoid the appearance of allowing the return of corporate privilege. In
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a circular of 21 February 1817, the baron Pasquier, Minister of Justice, acknowledged that
the 1816 law permitted the transmission of office for certain classes of public functionary
such  as  the  brokers,  in  the  name  of  safeguarding  public  order.  But  he  vigorously
maintained that the law ‘has not revived the venality of office, which is not in harmony with our
institutions…’43 Insofar as the public functionaries were accorded exclusive rights in the
name of public order, Pasquier’s argument went, then the designated successors would
have  to  be  individuals  who  would  reliably  safeguard this  order.  Thus,  in  this  view,
monopolies such as that possessed by the Company were not truly corporate privileges ;
rather, they were necessary elements of a just and secure public order.
19 The baron’s  arguments  notwithstanding,  reactions  to the  law were  decidedly  mixed.
While, outside official circles, the law did find some defenders,44 it also drew substantial
amounts of criticism. Some critics lambasted the fiscal and tax measures of the law.45
Others trained their sights on the ways the law restricted access to the labour market.
One anonymous pamphleteer in particular plainly stated that the 1816 law had revived
corporatism,  arguing that  ‘the corps of  the brokers’  had rendered the profession the
domain of just a few select families.46 If the Restoration state truly wanted to remedy such
an injustice, the author declared, ‘the consequence will be drawn that the government
must without delay annihilate a privilege, whose results can become so pernicious, and of
which personal interest would have the duration prolonged.’47
20 The Restoration state  did not  repeal  the 1816 law,  and the Company’s  monopoly on
financial intermediation at the Paris Stock Exchange would remain legally valid. But if the
Company  was  thus  granted  corporate  representation,  just  what  the  rights  and
responsibilities of this representation were constituted an open question.
 
The Sandrié-Vincourt Affair, Solidarity, and Corporate
Property
21 The Sandrié-Vincourt scandal provided a crucial legal test for the meaning of corporate
representation and responsibility. This test was also a part of the wider transformation of
the  corporate  form  specifically  as  a  business  vehicle.  The  1807  Commercial  Code
established three primary forms of  business association—the société  en nom collectif,  a
regular partnership with unlimited liability, the société en commandite, a kind of limited
partnership, as well as the société anonyme, a joint-stock company with limited liability.48
With its high degree of protection from exposure to liability for investors, the société
anonyme was  the  most  conducive  form  of  association  for  large-scale  enterprises. 49
However, the drafters of the Commercial Code were highly wary of it as, ill-managed,
such forms of business association had, in the words of Councilor of State Michel-Louis-
Étienne  Regnaud  de  Saint-Jean  Angély  in  1807,  ‘jeopardised  the  fortunes  of  the
stockholders and administrators, altered momentarily the general credit, and imperiled
public tranquility.’50 In order to control such risks,  the state required that all  sociétés
anonymes submit  to  an  arduous  authorisation  process  by  the  government.  This
authorisation was both difficult to obtain and sparingly granted : in the sixty-year span
between the  promulgation of  the  Commercial  Code in  1807 and the  liberalisation of
incorporation law in 1867,  fewer than 650 sociétés  anonymes were registered with the
government.51 During the first half of the nineteenth century, therefore, businesses had
to navigate between several different forms of association, with correspondingly different
levels of exposure to liability.
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22 The conflict between Sandrié-Vincourt’s creditors and the Company was embedded in
this precarious navigation of the corporate form. The Company was not, itself, a venue
for  channelling  capital  into  enterprise  or  investment ;  that  task  belonged  to  the
transactions between individual agents and their clients at the Paris Stock Exchange,
transactions which, at the time, were overwhelmingly directed towards public debt. The
Company did, however, represent and supervise this fundamental conduit for the flow of
capital into public debt. It was thus implicated in both the developing forms of business
organisation  and  the  reconstruction  of  intermediary  corporate  bodies  in  the  post-
revolutionary milieu. If the Company enjoyed a form of corporate representation and
monopoly privilege according to 1816 law, was it also subject to the liability exposure that
characterised business enterprise in France according to business law ? Did collective
representation imply collective responsibility ? It was precisely this question that divided
Sandrié-Vincourt’s creditors from the Company’s lawyers.
23 As early as 26 February 1821, rumours of misbehaviour had prompted the Company to
issue an internal warning, enjoining the brokers to respect their professional limits. By 11
June 1821, Sandrié-Vincourt had personally fallen under suspicion.52 Prompted by unease
within the brokers’ ranks over Sandrié-Vincourt’s mounting debts, two members of the
Company audited his account books. However, on 12 March 1822, they reported back that
while Sandrié-Vincourt was indeed responsible for considerable sums, his assets were
sufficient to allay any fear.53
24 In a little over a year’s time, this confidence in Sandrié-Vincourt would evaporate. On 11
August  1823,  he  was  brought  before  the  Company’s  disciplinary  body,  the  Syndical
Chamber.  In  addition to  a  unsustainable  financial  position,  he  was  also  suspected of
illegally  speculating  for  his  own  account.54 Sandrié-Vincourt  vigorously  denied  any
wrongdoing, claiming that such accusations could only have sprung from the deluded
minds of jealous rivals. He did admit to purchasing public debt for his own account, but
only, he swore, as a means of covering his debts.55 The Chamber, less than persuaded by
this sudden confession, admonished Sandrié-Vincourt that he had transgressed the laws
governing  the  brokers,  crossing  over  into  censure-worthy  misconduct.  Worse,  in
engaging in such risky operations, he had traded on his honour in pursuit of speculative
profit.56
25 Sandrié-Vincourt contritely admitted to his misbehaviour. In an effort to clear his name,
he offered to open his  books to a more extensive audit.  Over the next several  days,
representatives of the Company pored over his accounts. Initially, they did not find much
evidence of wrongdoing. But Sandrié-Vincourt was not free from suspicion just yet. Most
worrying  was  the  nearly  two-and-a-half  million  francs  he  owed  uncovered.57 He
responded that there was no reason for concern, as he had money coming in from other
accounts. However, it was not in his hands just yet ; he would need some time—three or
four months at least, he claimed—before he could liquidate his position. Placated for the
moment,  the  Company nonetheless  tasked  him with  drafting  a  more  comprehensive
overview of his accounts.58
26 Sandrié-Vincourt’s  efforts  at  self-exculpation  did  not  last  long.  Growing  increasingly
uncertain of his solvency, on 18 August 1823, the Company ordered Sandrié-Vincourt to
close out his account immediately and prohibited him from engaging in any transactions
other than those necessary for liquidation. Moreover, the Company would supervise this
liquidation, with the proceeds and securities being placed in a special, dedicated account.
59
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27 Sandrié-Vincourt presented another overview of his accounts on 20 August 1823, which
still failed to clarify the way out of his financial entanglements.60 On 26 August 1823, the
Company  heard  the  report  of  Gublin  and  Dosne,  the  representatives  tasked  with
researching Sandrié-Vincourt’s books. Gublin sorrowly informed that Sandrié-Vincourt’s
true situation in fact surpassed all dark rumours swirling about him. ‘Just when we had
finished examining his books,’ Gublin reported, ‘Sandrié, from whom we had not been
able to extract a single word regarding the public reproach made of him of serving illicit
interests, and about which, despite all our research, we had not been able to discover a
single trace in the books, finally felt that the moment of revelation had arrived, and he
showed us the abyss that had opened beneath his feet.’61 Sandrié-Vincourt’s outstanding
debtors had left him high and dry, drastically reducing his available funds. Magnifying
this deficit was the fact that his liabilities were far greater than he had led the Company
to believe. In secret accounts unrecorded in his official ledger, Sandrié-Vincourt had run
up obligations of more than ten million francs, as against roughly two million francs in
assets. All told, Sandrié-Vincourt was facing a debt just north of eight million francs.62
Gublin was thunderstruck by the audacity of this egregious deception.  He could only
miserably  report  to  the  Company  that  ‘never  has  man given  such  a  great  proof  of
weakness and blindness.’63 
28 The Company’s reaction was swift. Sandrié-Vincourt was immediately prohibited from
entering the Exchange. The next day, the Minister of Finance was given a full report of
the affair. In an attempt to pay off Sandrié-Vincourt’s creditors to the extent possible, the
Company took a more active hand in managing the assets that Sandrié-Vincourt had
placed in its control.64 This greater involvement in the liquidation process would soon
become a necessity, as Sandrié-Vincourt fled the country by the end of the month.
29 His creditors, however, remained in France. Since pursuing Sandrié-Vincourt personally
would have been futile given his absence, they instead initiated legal action against the
Company.
30 The creditors propounded their argument most assertively in an 1824 legal brief, De la
responsibilité solidaire de la Chambre syndicale des Agens de Change et de la Compagnie qu’elle
représente,  penned  by  their  counsel,  G. B.  Battur.  In  it,  Battur  sought  to  determine
whether the form of corporate property signified by the Company also entailed joint
responsibility, as it had prior to the Revolution.65
31 Battur’s primary avenue of inquiry was clear :  ‘Legally,  is  the Company of Brokers jointly
responsible towards third parties for the prevarications of its members ?’66 Holding the Company
responsible  as  a  whole  for  Sandrié-Vincourt’s  losses  would  require  establishing  the
Company’s full legal responsibility for the financial losses of its members in general, as
well as clear evidence of the Company failing this responsibility in regards to Sandrié-
Vincourt’s sorry lot in particular.
32 For Battur, the specificities of the corporate monopoly reaffirmed by the 1816 finance law
meant  that  the  brokers  were  not  simply  individual  economic  actors.  The broker,  he
argued, ‘is only a member of a moral and indivisible corps of brokers. It is to this moral
and indivisible corps alone that belong the rights of listing the prices of public funds, of
purchasing and selling legally.’67 Membership in the Company created professional and
moral bonds between individual brokers. Indeed, the two kinds of bond were connected.
A ‘corps moral’ could signify an abstract entity that was subject to legal regulation and
liability, as were the various forms of sociétés according to the Commercial Code.68 And the
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invocation of a ‘corps moral’ also referenced the tradition of corporatism. A key function
of the pre-revolutionary corporations had been to provide a ‘moral community’ for their
members, fostering intra-professional loyalty and fraternity.69 Such comity was essential
in ensuring that corporate monopolies ran smoothly.
33 If, for Battur, the moral bonds of corporatism undergirded monopoly rights, they also
entailed corresponding obligations. Citing legislation ranging from Old Regime arrêts to
the 1807 Commercial Code, Battur noted that the Company’s legal monopoly on brokering
transactions at the Exchange had been repeatedly expressed. Moreover, he observed, the
law stipulated that trade in the public debt could only legitimately take place at the
Exchange.  The  brokers  were  required  to  carefully  record  every  transaction  in  their
account books, with the two transacting brokers going over these books together in order
to render a contract complete and legal.70 Outside the domain of the Company, brokers
could not legally fulfil their professional duties. The Company, therefore, really was a
‘moral and indivisible corps’—moral, in the sense that it forged affective and professional
links between brokers, and indivisible, in the sense that without the Company’s oversight,
the brokers could not legally execute financial transactions at the Exchange. 
34 The Company,  in Battur’s  view,  thus truly constituted a  form of  corporate property,
insofar as it maintained supervisory authority over its members, chaining them together
in solidaristic  property relations.  The brokers,  he wrote,  ‘constitute a  true firm [une
veritable  société]  which  commands  even  more  imperiously  the  public  faith  than  an
ordinary commercial  enterprise,  because we are free to refuse our confidence in the
latter in order to grant it to another, while we are not free to do so in the negotiation of
government securities without the intermediation of the Company of Brokers.’71 Deriving
profits from its legal  monopoly at the Exchange,  the Company was true to its name,
functioning like other commercial firms. But, Battur noted, any citizen wanting to trade
in public debt was constrained to operate through the Company. He argued that this
constraint on the politically sensitive trade in public debt meant that the Company was
duty-bound to provide for the safety of the financial market. The brokers thus formed ‘an
indivisible  whole  by  the  simultaneity,  the  publicity,  and  the  symmetry  of  their
operations, even in the case where the Public Treasury, basing upon the body the task of
recording and certifying the price of funds and of offering,  so to speak,  a lantern to
citizens who toss themselves into the perilous sea of credit, would not, by the nature of
things, have imposed on all the brokers a single and joint vigilance.’72
35 In any case, Battur was quick to note, this moral responsibility was backed by law. He
called upon the authority of antiquity, writing, ‘The immortal wisdom of the Roman laws
must guide us in such a grave matter. In Rome, all the colleagues invested in the same
public function were jointly responsible, and what one of them did was owned by all and
became the deed of all, and each one was responsible and accountable for the totality of
the management  and the sums entrusted...’73 Battur  was  referring specifically  to  the
concept of solidarité, joint responsibility, in business law, which regulated, among other
forms, commercial relationships between debtors and creditors. In such instances, if a
group contracted a single debt together, then creditors could bring a claim against each
individual  of  that  group.74 Though  stemming  from Roman  law,  the  concept  of  joint
responsibility did persist in post-revolutionary French law, with one such persistence
being shareholders and their proxies.75 Battur was attempting to filter Sandrié-Vincourt’s
creditors’ legal action through this particular conception of liability :  since, as he had
argued above, the Company was co-implicated in all that a broker did, and since Sandrié-
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Vincourt had quite clearly transgressed established legal boundaries, then, the argument
went, his creditors therefore had a legitimate financial claim against the Company as a
whole.
36 However, Battur faced a problem of legal interpretation. In general, joint responsibility
had to be affirmatively stated.76 The relevant law in this case was article 1202 of the Civil
Code,  which stated that joint responsibility ‘is  never presumed ;  it  must be expressly
stipulated.’77 Battur circumvented this difficulty by arguing that that article related only
to standard contracts, not to relationships in which one party delegated legal authority to
another,  as  was  the  case  when  clients  empowered  brokers  to  buy  or  sell  for  their
accounts.78 He contended that the commanding law therefore was not article 1202, but
rather article 1995, which stated : ‘When there are multiple empowered or authorised
agents established by the same act, there is joint responsibility between them only insofar
as  it  is  expressed.’79 Battur  intended to  show that  the  regulations  providing  for  the
Company’s  exclusive  rights  of  financial  intermediation  also  amounted  to  a  tacit
expression of joint responsibility, which would suffice in the absence of a more explicit
statement to that  end.  Undoubtedly,  he acknowledged,  to impute joint  responsibility
without such an explicit affirmation would normally equate to gross exaggeration. But,
he claimed, ‘this vice of exaggeration no longer exists when it is the law itself that acts,
and when it regulates the interests of third parties, of which it is the organ ; above all
when it entrusts to its agents the deposit of the fortune and security of families.’80 If the
Company justified its corporate monopoly in terms of the public interest, then, Battur
argued, it would be the duty of law to hold the Company jointly responsible and liable, in
defence of this self-same public interest.
37 Battur claimed that the Company’s rights and activities really did equate to an admission
of joint responsibility. He wrote, ‘It seems, in effect, that in the political order, as in the
civil order, this unity is the soul of the corps moral and the guarantor of each particular
interest. If such is in general the spirit of the law in the order of the public interest, such
it must be, with even greater reason, when it rules and protects private interests.’81 If
‘unity’  was  the  essence  of  the  corps  moral,  and  if  the  Company  was,  as  Battur  had
previously claimed, itself a corps moral, then surely there must be some grounds to claim
that the Company must therefore be jointly responsible for debts incurred under its
watch. Citing other instances of presumed joint responsibility, Battur noted that in all
these cases, this presumption derived from mutual duties of observation and vigilance.82
And it was precisely such professional vigilance for which the Company was created :
...if a superior power is always ready to repress them [authorised agents of third
parties], if a moral responsibility much more powerful still than a purely material
responsibility enchains them in the limits of their duties, then how could it be that
the brokers would not be submitted to a responsibility that could prevent their
misdeeds, and consequently would not be sentenced to the reparation of all the evil
that they have voluntarily and knowingly tolerated?83
38 The Company represented this ‘superior power’ supervising the individual brokers, one
whose ‘moral responsibility,’ as a corps moral, overrode other, more ‘material’ forms of
responsibility; Battur’s suggestion was that the moral and professional links necessarily
formed by the Company were sufficient to establish solidarité, even in the absence of its
explicit stipulation. By the very nature of its institutional design, the Company was thus
held to be jointly responsible for the losses of its members.
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39 This issue of corporate liability, Battur further claimed, affected the safety and stability of
society as a whole. He passionately argued :
Reason, public fortune, the importance of the exact fixing of the prices of funds, of
the regularity and the reality of  markets,  the commonality of  the operations in
which all participate in a single and same place, and at fixed hours, the necessity of
the care of the national credit, the sacred deposit of the fortune of citizens, the
confidence and good harmony between the State and individuals, all this should
command the brokers to form a body to protect such great interests and to render
safe and easy the movement of the political and financial wheel, and yet they are
able  to  act  in  isolation,  individually,  shattering  and  dividing  public  confidence,
while not offering any certain guarantee!!!84
40 The brokers were intermediaries in multiple senses: bringing together purchasers and
sellers of the public debt, they also mediated between state and citizen. With investments
in the public  debt  combining both savings and judgments of  creditworthiness of  the
current regime in one form, the brokers also joined together public political authority
and private financial interests. With the vitality of the post-revolutionary state at stake,
and with the specifics of the brokers’ professional duties seeming to bind them in mutual
supervision in practice, their legal ability to ‘act in isolation’ must, according to Battur, be
given up for a liability regime of joint responsibility.
41 Battur concluded that the conduct of the Company gave the lie to any claims on the
public interest. Rather, the Company’s corporate monopoly substituted private interests
for the public good. He wrote,
The sluggishness of a century accustomed to seeing a guilty condescendence taking
the place of  the exactitude of  the law,  of  the strictness  of  the example,  and of
substituting  I  know  not  how  many  privileges  of  monopoly  and  centralisation,
veritable scourges of  modern societies,  for the fundamental  interest  of  families,
sole  elements of  national  wealth and public  credit;  unbridled cupidity,  contrary
prejudice and routine, the usurpation of opposed habits, an appalling egoism: must
these therefore take from the law its energy, disfiguring and sullying it, and leading
it away from those superior interests that alone constitute the public interest? No,
at least if we are not to outrage overtly, in such a solemn case, the public spirit and
good morals. In placing the duties of [the Company] in regards to the facts of its
conduct,  we  will  be  profoundly  penetrated  by  the  necessity  of  a  resounding
settlement.85
42 For Battur, the Company’s claims signified nothing so much as a reversion to a century of
privilege, a century that should, by rights, lay definitively in the past. To exempt the
Company from legal responsibility, according to Battur, would be to enervate the central
norms of  legal  equality,  allowing insidious and invidious elements such as  ‘appalling
egoism’ to direct a process that was, ostensibly, meant to be free and equal for all. The
Company must be held responsible, in keeping with the principle of joint responsibility,
for Sandrié-Vincourt’s debts, bringing it in line with a post-revolutionary society that,
Battur’s  rhetoric  suggested,  could  not  abide  corporate  privilege  in  an  age  of  legal
equality.  For  Battur,  corporate  representation  therefore  entailed  shared  corporate
liability.
43 The  Company  was  quick  to  defend  itself.  Its  high-powered  legal  counsel  wrote  a
countervailing legal brief, Mémoire à consulter et consultation, pour la Compagnie de mm. les
Agens de Change de Paris,  défendeurs, contre les syndics de la faillite de m. Sandrié-Vincourt,
demandeurs, arguing against Sandrié-Vincourt’s creditors and in favour of the Company.
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The first part of the brief was written by prominent lawyer André-Marie-Jean-Jacques
Dupin, who would soon rise to political office as a deputy.86
44 Against the claim that the Company had hidden Sandrié-Vincourt’s wrongdoings from
the proper authorities,  Dupin countered that the Company’s legal obligations were to
report to higher administrative authorities, rather than to police agencies.87 And it had
done so by alerting the Minister of Finance about the impending bankruptcy of Sandrié-
Vincourt, with the Minister subsequently approving of the Company’s disciplinary action.
88 As to whether the Company had failed its supervisory duties, Dupin maintained that it
had,  in  fact,  performed these  duties  to  the  best  of  its  abilities.89 The issue was  that
Sandrié-Vincourt had kept a double set of books, purposefully deceiving the Company
and limiting its capability to intervene effectively ; as Dupin put it, the Company ‘could
not have had the intention to settle a deficit of which it did not know the existence.’90
Once it was aware of the magnitude of Sandrié-Vincourt’s losses, the Company moved as
expeditiously as possible.91 In fact, Dupin sniffed, much of the trouble could have been
avoided had the creditors pushed their case earlier. The creditors could have alerted the
authorities  sooner,  averting  what  subsequently  became  a  financial  catastrophe,  he
suggested. But they did not, attempting to displace this failure of duty onto the Company
by means of the current trial. As Dupin dryly observed, ‘May these creditors thus cease
reproaching [the Company] for not doing what they alone could have done.’92
45 In any event, Dupin maintained, the Company could not be held jointly responsible for
Sandrié-Vincourt’s debts. The brokers’ professional activity, he averred, did not in any
way  meet  the  legal  requirements  for  joint  responsibility.  In  fact,  Dupin  argued,  the
practice of finance at the Exchange actually individualised the transacting parties, even
as the demands of public safety required corporate representation through the Company
to supervise the general flow of transactions. Investors in the public debt contracted not
with the Company, but with single brokers : ‘It is not at all with the Company of brokers
that the client deals with, it is with the broker of his choice. It is in the secret of his office,
without  the  intervention  and  beyond  the  surveillance  of  the  Company,  that  the
authorising and depositary contract is formed between the client and the broker.’93 The
Company may have had supervisory powers over the brokers,  but it  was not present
when the buy and sell orders were designed in private consultations between broker and
client. The law, according to Dupin, was therefore clear. Without express stipulation, the
Company could not be held jointly responsible.
46 Moreover, the practicalities of financial intermediation served to oppose the brokers to
one another,  not  place in them in solidaristic  relations.  Indeed,  he observed,  ‘to the
contrary they can act one against the other. How could joint responsibility, indivisibility
between  two  brokers,  exist  in  a  market  where  one  figures  as  seller,  the  other  as
purchaser, or where one certifies and guarantees the signatures he transmits !’94 Brokers
were, literally, counterparties, with one party selling and the other purchasing. Certainly,
an agreement was reached when the contract cleared, but, for Dupin, this agreement was
the outcome of the reconciliation of countervailing interests, not evidence of collusion
giving rise to joint responsibility.
47 This individualising function of the financial markets also reflected back on the nature of
the Company’s corporatism. The plaintiffs had charged that the Company was obligated
to meet Sandrié-Vincourt’s debts in full, a proposal to which Dupin could only react with
astonishment.  ‘It  must  be  said,  it  would  be  a  truly  extraordinary  engagement,’  he
declared, ‘that by which a Chamber of discipline would have compelled the persons and
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disposed of the goods of an entire class of public officers, for the payment of debt that is
foreign to them. The idea of such an engagement must have made this jurisconsult smile,
who  transformed  the  Company  of  Brokers  into  a  commercial  enterprise  [une  société
commerciale] ;  apparently,  the  members  of  the  Chamber  of  discipline  would  be  its
directors.’95 Dupin’s  arch  swipe  at  Sandrié-Vincourt’s  creditors’  claims—their  legal
advocates  likely  did  not  chortle  with  disingenuous  mirth  while  composing  their
arguments—uncovered the supposed absurdity of holding liable the entire Company for
the outstanding debt. To do so, according to Dupin, would be to assimilate the Company
to  existing  forms  of  business  association.  But  he  suggested  that  such  a  comparison
amounted to a false identity. The Company, in fact, was not a commercial enterprise,
properly  speaking.  The  Company  did  have  supervisory  authority,  but  it  was  not
implicated  in  individual  transactions  between  broker  and  client.  Most  crucially,  for
Dupin, the Company could not take out debt that bound other members, as would be the
case for commercial partnerships under a regime of joint responsibility. The Company
may have represented the brokers as a corporate form, but it was not a brokerage firm.
This form of corporate property did not therefore obligate its individual members.
48 After this rhetorical fusillade directed at Sandrié-Vincourt’s creditors, Dupin turned to a
positive argument about the status of the Company in an appended Consultation, joined by
his co-counsels, Tripier, Gauthier, and Bonnet. The Company, they stated, was a ‘moral
being  [être  moral].’96 The  legal  counsel  here  agreed  with  Battur  that  the  Company
possessed  a  kind  of  abstract  juridical  personality.  But  this  sense  of  a  ‘moral  being’
importantly  diverged  from  Battur’s  sense.  As  regards  the  liquidation  of  Sandrié-
Vincourt’s accounts, the Company, counsel claimed, ‘had only done acts of conservation.
It could do so, it should do so, for the honour of the Corps as in the interest in third
parties.  Those  third  parties  surely  find  it  impossible  to  recall  a  single  act  of  [the
Company] that was prejudicial towards them...’97 Corporate honour was converted into
professional probity.98 The ‘honour of the Corps’ derived less from the collective interests
of the brokers than from a defence of third parties extrinsic to the Company ; that is, the ‘
honour’ of the moral being stemmed from the brokers’ duties as financial intermediaries,
which connected individual brokers and clients, rather than brokers to each other.99 
49 Not  a  commercial  enterprise,  the  Company  was  a  corps  moral—both  Battur  and  the
Company’s legal counsel would agree on this latter point, insofar as it meant that the
Company had a kind of abstract juridical personality. But, according to the Company’s
legal  counsel,  this  corps was  dedicated  not  so  much  to  the  particularistic  collective
interests of the brokers, but for the wider investing public. Since the Company and the
brokers, ostensibly, ensured the safety and regularity of finance at the Exchange, they
also safeguarded the credit of the state and the financial wellbeing of families, with which
the brokers had been entrusted in the form of investment. But, the counsel was careful to
note, the brokers did so on an individual-to-individual basis—client-to-broker, as well as
broker-to-broker, reconciling contrary interests through converging on a clearing price
for securities—with the Company exercising supervisory duties at a generalised level. Just
as the atomistic logic of financial exchange individualised the transacting parties, so too
did it turn corporatism into a kind of series of individualised relationships.
50 Battur and Dupin’s briefs encapsulated the legal reasoning behind the competing sides of
the Sandrié-Vincourt case. Dupin’s logic would win out in the end : in a decision of 31
March 1827, the Court of Paris sided with the brokers, ruling that the Company could not
be  held  responsible  for  the  debts  of  its  members.100 The  case  would  rise  no  further
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through the courts.101 The trial had been widely covered by the Parisian press at the time,
attracting an audience appreciative of financial scandal ;102 later, the Sandrié-Vincourt




51 The Company of Parisian Brokers had had its status as a corporation statutorily validated
by the 1816 law on finances. But the challenge of Sandrié-Vincourt’s creditors was over
the rights and responsibilities this corporate form entailed. For Battur, the Company’s
Old Regime roots persisted. It was a corps moral, establishing enduring links between its
members.  These links meant that the brokers were jointly responsible,  rendering the
Company liable for Sandrié-Vincourt’s debts.
52 Dupin disagreed. Or, rather, he agreed that the Company constituted a corps moral, but
disagreed over what such a designation might signify in post-revolutionary society ; both
counsels thus invoked the idiom of corporatism, but their meanings were opposed. For
Dupin, the brokers’ corporate spirit was directed outwards, towards the investing public,
rather than inwards towards their  colleagues.  The Company represented a corporate
entity in the legal landscape of post-revolutionary France so as to ensure the regularity of
financial investments at the Exchange. The brokers thus retained their intermediary body
in the form of the Company, but the nature of financial intermediation individualised
them, so that they could better serve the economic interests of private parties.
53 The  success  of  the  Company  of  Parisian  Brokers  in  the  Sandrié-Vincourt  scandal
ultimately clarifies a critical  path to legitimacy for corporate property and collective
representation  in  the  post-revolutionary  milieu.  It  reveals  how  corporate,  collective
bodies and a state that had supposedly abolished corporatism could be reconciled bi-
directionally. Collective bodies might, on the one hand, disavow particularistic interests
and claim to represent the general interest (or, more aptly, a distillation of an economic
sector, such as the general commercial interest). But on the other, such bodies might also
embrace  particularistic  corporate  interests,  occupying  a  supposedly  forbidden  place
between state and citizen, precisely because such collective representation was thought
necessary to safeguard individual economic interests. The Company of Parisian Brokers—
with the capacity to represent a particular profession in a particular slice of the economy,
to  supervise  and  discipline  its  members,  to  hold  and  dispose  of  its  own  property—
defended  its  legitimacy  exactly  because  it  was  such  corporatism  that  permitted
individuals to safely transact at the Exchange. It was in this sense that Dupin and his co-
counsels argued, successfully, that while the Company’s monopoly was valid, nonetheless
liability  for  mismanaged  property  lay  solely  with  the  transacting  individuals.  The
corporation, in this view, was what provided a secure and stable arena for individual
economic actors to invest their capital, reaping the rewards or suffering the losses of
their risks individually.
54 This bi-directionality of post-revolutionary collective representation therefore helps us
understand  how  the  ‘double  movement’  of  modern  and  older  corporatism,  of  the
perceived need for regulated economic order and a suspicion of intermediary bodies, was
ultimately anchored in the Restoration world. Navigating the developments in liability
law governing the corporation as a form of business association, affirmatively defending
its  professional  monopoly,  the Company asserted itself  as  a  particularistic  body that
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lubricated the machinery of individual financial risk. Within the ‘blurry or flexible’ space
of the post-revolutionary state, such third terms between general and individual interests
could, in some cases, be reconciled. And, in this case, through the intermediation of the
Company of Parisian Brokers, they were.
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ABSTRACTS
This article examines the Sandrié-Vincourt scandal at the Paris Stock Exchange, legal liability,
and  the  contested  meaning  of  corporate  property  during  the  Restoration  regime.  Sandrié-
Vincourt,  a  stockbroker  for  multiple  sizable  accounts,  had  accrued  immense  debts  through
legally questionable means. Thoroughly insolvent, he fled the country in 1823. In an attempt to
recoup their losses, his creditors sought to hold the Compagnie des Agents de Change de Paris, the
state-sanctioned representative body for the Paris stockbrokers, collectively liable. Invoking the
legal principle of joint responsibility, in which outside parties could be held liable for the debts of
others,  the  creditors  argued  that,  because  the  professional  association  was  charged  with
overseeing the stockbrokers’ behaviour, it should also be charged with resolving their debts. The
Compagnie disagreed,  arguing  that,  despite  collective,  corporate  representation,  Sandrié-
Vincourt’s debts were his and his alone. The Compagnie’s ultimately successful defence in this
dramatic  and jurisprudentially  influential  trial  thus  reveals  the  bidirectional  means  through
which  individualized  economic  risk,  intermediary  bodies,  and  corporate  property  could  be
reconciled in the post-revolutionary world.
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Cet  article  va  étudier  le  scandale  Sandrié-Vincourt  à  la  Bourse  de  Paris,  la  responsabilité
juridique,  et  le  sens  contesté  de  la  propriété  corporative  pendant  la  Restauration.  Sandrié-
Vincourt,  agent  de  change  pour  plusieurs  comptes  considérables,  avait  accumulé  des  dettes
immenses par des moyens légalement douteux. Tout à fait insolvable, il fuit le pays en 1823. Dans
l’espoir  de  récupérer  leurs  pertes,  ses  créanciers  cherchèrent  à  engager  la  responsabilité
collective de la  Compagnie  des  Agents  de  Change de  Paris,  le  corps représentatif  sanctionné par
l’état. Invoquant le principe juridique de la solidarité, selon lequel les tiers pourraient être tenus
responsables des dettes d’autrui, les créanciers ont fait valoir que, étant donné que l’association
professionnelle était chargée de surveiller le comportement des agents de change, elle devrait
également être chargée de régler leurs dettes. La Compagnie n’était pas de cet avis, affirmant que,
malgré  la  représentation collective  et  corporative,  les  dettes  de  Sandrié-Vincourt  étaient  les
siennes et les siennes uniquement. La défense finalement réussie de la Compagnie dans ce procès
dramatique et juridiquement influent révèle ainsi le moyen bidirectionnel par lequel le risque
économique individualisé, les corps intermédiaires, et la propriété corporative pourraient être
réconciliés dans le monde post-révolutionnaire.
INDEX
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